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Abstract
Expansion and amplification of weak randomness with untrusted quantum
devices has recently become a very fruitful topic of research. Here we con-
tribute with a procedure for amplifying a single weak random source using tri-
partite GHZ-type entangled states. If the quality of the source reaches a fixed
threshold R = 1
4
log2(10), perfect random bits can be produced. This tech-
nique can be used to extract randomness from sources that can’t be extracted
neither classically, nor by existing procedures developed for Santha–Vazirani
sources. Our protocol works with a single fault-free device decomposable
into three non-communicating parts, that is repeatedly reused throughout
the amplification process.
Keywords: Device independence, Randomness extraction
1. Introduction
Randomness is an invaluable resource in today’s computer science. The
need for randomness of very high quality (close to uniformly distributed and
uncorrelated to any other existing data) is evident especially in the field of
cryptography, where malfunctioning random number generators can cause
catastrophic failures and lead to total loss of security [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
However, on the classical level no true randomness is available. Produc-
tion of pseudo-random sequences is based on assumptions on inaccessibility
of certain information to the adversary, such as thermal noise of semicon-
ductors or movement of mouse cursor of a computer user. In classical cryp-
tography different techniques are used to tackle with such limited sources of
randomness. Depending on the available resources, randomness extractors
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can either produce almost perfect randomness from a weak source and a short
perfectly random key (so called seed), or they can use several independent
weak random sources to produce a shorter, but almost perfect output (see [6]
for a survey). Nevertheless in the most pessimistic adversarial scenario one
is unable to rule out adversary’s full knowledge of the underlying processes,
because classical physical theories are deterministic.
With quantum protocols production of random numbers seems to be easy,
thanks to inherent randomness of quantum physics – measurement in a basis
complementary to the basis in which the states were produced can guarantee
a source of perfect randomness. Thus, if one can trust the devices used for
randomness production, the task is theoretically trivial and experimentally
feasible up to commercial applications [7].
One can, however, go a bit further and ask if the production of random
numbers could be safe not only against an external adversary, but also to-
wards the supplier of the device itself. The importance of this requirement is
underlined by the experimental complexity and fragility of quantum devices,
which practically prohibits direct testing of processes appearing within the
device. Such security can be indeed achieved by using devices utilizing quan-
tum states that exhibit super-classical correlation properties, which can be
tested solely by processing input and output data. This check of the honesty
of the devices, which is often performed simultaneously with the implemented
protocol, is referred in a broader scope as device independence.
To design a device independent random number generator, one can use
the fact that states exhibiting super-classical correlation properties exhibit
intrinsic randomness if measured locally. A line of research was devoted to
expansion of free randomness using quantum devices (see e. g. [8, 9, 10,
11, 12]), which, in the spirit of seeded randomness extractors, expands the
length of preexisting independent random seed. Recently several researchers
attempted to solve the problem of perfect randomness production, suggesting
ways to amplify existing weak randomness with the use of untrusted quantum
devices (characterized either as Santha-Vazirani source [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]
or min-entropy source [18, 19]). In a related recent work [20, 21] authors
examine the minimal properties of random seed output needed to perform
Bell tests. Some of these works consider even more general scenario, in
which the adversary is only restricted by no-signaling. This can also be seen
as an attempt to minimize the assumptions for which independent perfect
randomness exists.
Within this paper we contribute to the topic of production of perfect
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randomness with the use of untrusted quantum devices and a single weak
source of available randomness. We will show that production of nearly
perfect random numbers is possible in a very simple and experimentally fea-
sible scenario with a rather weak demand on the weak random source. We
utilize three-partite GHZ-type entanglement, which leads to a possibility of
distinguishing between classical and quantum states in one shot experiment,
if perfect quantum devices are assumed. The existing protocols amplifying
min-entropy sources [18, 19] use large number of independent devices, which
significantly simplifies the analysis due to non-existing memory effects. The
main upside of this paper is that we are considering only a single three-partite
device to run our protocol. The price to pay is that our protocol works only
for sources with min-entropy rate R ≥ 1
4
log2(10).
The paper is organized as follows: In the section II we define the prereq-
uisites of the protocol. In section III weak random sources are defined and
discussed. The main results are presented for both the zero-error scenario
and risking scenario in section IV, including the discussion on possible quan-
tum strategies. In section V we conclude and in Appendix we provide the
proof of optimality of the re-send attack.
2. Prerequisites
Consider a following scenario: Alice would like to produce perfect random
numbers. She asks her supplier, Eve, to supply a random number generator
(RNG). However, Alice does not really trust in Eve’s honesty and would like
to check that Eve really supplied a good RNG and produced bits are random
even conditioned on the knowledge of Eve.
On the other hand Eve would like to influence, or at least learn about
the bits produced by the RNG. To do so, she is granted all power except the
following limitations:
1. Alice’s laboratory is safe towards tampering and any communication
with outside world.
2. Alice can ask Eve to deliver RNG in parts. These parts can be pro-
hibited to communicate within the laboratory among themselves. This can
be achieved by perfectly isolating the devices, or by securing space-like sep-
aration of the devices during the whole process.
3. Eve is constrained by the laws of quantum mechanics. In particular any
statistics achieved among parts of the RNG must obey relevant Tsirelson’s
3
bounds [22]. Note that it is not enough to constrain Eve by no-signaling
condition as in this case perfect cheating strategies for GHZ game exist.
4. Alice has a source of somewhat random numbers. Apparently, if Alice
has no such source, Eve could predetermine all steps of Alice in advance,
simulate any results that Alice would expect and use to check honesty of
Eve. The level of randomness of the source needed is a crucial parameter of
the protocol and will be discussed later.
3. Weak random sources
We model randomness Alice uses in her protocol by a random variable
X. Alice’s information about the probability distribution of X is P (X),
which might likely be a perfectly random distribution. We also assume that
Eve has a random variable E with a probability distribution P (E). Eve’s
information about X is given by the probability distribution P (X|E) and can
be viewed as the level of correlation between the variables X and E. The only
information we suppose about the distribution P (X|E) is that it is random
at least to a certain extent; thus, we allow the output of X conditioned on
E to be distributed according to any probability distribution with sufficient
min-entropy. The goal is then to design an algorithm, which can produce
random outcome independent on the distribution P (X|E).
We say that X conditioned on E contains some randomness if
Pg(X|E) =
∑
e
P (E = e)Pg(X|E = e) < 1, (1)
where Pg(X|E = e) = maxx P (X = x|E = e). This is equivalent to a
condition that for at least one output e that Eve can receive with non-zero
probability, she is unable to predict the output of Alice’s random variable X
with certainty.
We quantify the amount of randomness of a distribution by its (condi-
tional) min-entropy defined by
H∞(X|E) = − log2 Pg(X|E). (2)
Additionally, X is an (N, k) min-entropy source, if it outputs N bit strings
and H∞(X|E) ≥ k. We also define the min-entropy rate
R =
H∞(X|E)
N
, (3)
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quantifying bits of entropy of the source per produced random bit. Min-
entropy rate will be used as the figure of merit within this paper, character-
izing the quality of random source used.
Classically it is impossible to extract even a single partially random bit
from a single random source with N bit output and min-entropy smaller
than N − 1. This is due to the fact that any classical strategy used for the
extraction is a deterministic binary function known by the adversary and she
can adjust the source in such a way that the output of the function is fixed
(for details see e.g.[6]).
Here we shortly discuss a different definition of figure of merit of a random
source, namely the so called Santha–Vazirani or SV source introduced in [23]:
A string of random bit variables Zi is a δ-SV source (0 ≤ δ ≤ 12) with
respect to E if
1
2
− δ ≤ P (Zi = 0|E,Z1, . . . , Zi−1) ≤ 1
2
+ δ. (4)
For δ = 0 all Zi are uniformly distributed and mutually independent and any
randomness source, even completely deterministic one, can be described as a
SV–source with δ = 1
2
. Note that all possible distributions of N–bit strings
distributed according to a SV-source, have min-entropy at least − log2((12 +
δ)N) and the corresponding min-entropy rate R ≥ − log2(12 + δ). On the
other hand, there are distributions with high min-entropy, which cannot be
characterized as SV–sources with δ < 1
2
. In particular a source with a single
bit of the sequence fixed and all other bits perfectly random has min-entropy
H∞(X|E) = N − 1 and thus R → 1 for large N . Nevertheless, it can only
be characterized as a SV–source with δ = 1
2
.
This is due to the fact that SV–sources assume additional structure of
the randomly distributed N–bit strings, namely that the influence of the
adversary is limited locally (per bit), in contrast to the global limitation for
min-entropy sources. This leads to a fact that amplification of SV sources
is much easier in the sense that some amount of randomness is guaranteed
to be present in every single bit from the random source. On the contrary,
min-entropy sources guarantee only the global amount of randomness within
the whole string and any protocol has to be robust especially against sources
which can have a fixed bit value on some of the output bits.
In our work we put only minimal restrictions on the input random source
in terms of min-entropy and due to this fact the proposed procedure can be
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utilized on a much broader class of sources comparing to protocols using SV
sources.
4. Amplification of a single weak min-entropy Source
Our amplification protocol is based on a GHZ paradox [24]. The devices
used by the protocol are modeled as three non–communicating black boxes –
nothing is assumed about their inner workings – labeled A,B,C, each with
two possible inputs x, y, z ∈ {0, 1} and two possible outputs a, b, c ∈ {0, 1}.
One round of the protocol consists of using 2 bits from a biased random source
X to choose one of the four combinations of inputs xyz ∈ {111, 001, 010, 100}
(see Figure (1)). The round of the protocol is successful, if the outputs of
the boxes fulfill the condition
a⊕ b⊕ c = x ∧ y ∧ z, (5)
where ⊕ is the logical XOR and ∧ is the logical AND.
It is a well known fact that classical strategies allow the devices to produce
successful outputs with maximum probability 3
4
, while quantum strategy
of measuring the state |GHZ〉 = 1√
2
|000〉 + |111〉 in complementary bases
(σx if the input is 0 and σy if input is 1) yields the strategy to win with
probability 1. More importantly, it has been shown in [8] that all quantum
strategies succeeding in the protocol with probability 1 involve measuring (in
complementary bases) GHZ-like states or superpositions of thereof in higher
dimensions. This fact guarantees that if perfect quantum correlations are
observed, the outcomes of the boxes A and B yield two perfectly random
bits and it is exploited in a randomness expansion protocol of [8], where it is
supposed that inputs into black boxes can be chosen with uniform probability.
Here we investigate a scenario, where the inputs for the devices are chosen
according to a source X with conditional min-entropy rate R. The protocol
consists of n rounds, in each round a GHZ paradox is tested. The necessary
number of rounds will be specified later, but generally it depends on condi-
tional min-entropy rate R of the source X and desired quality of the output
random bit.
In order to create the inputs into n instances of GHZ test we need to draw
2n bits X = (R11, R
1
2;R
2
1, R
2
2; . . . ;R
n
1 , R
n
2 ) from a (2n, 2Rn)– weak random
source. In the round i two bits Ri1R
i
2 are used to choose one out of four
possible input combinations. Let r = r11r
1
2, ..., r
n
1 r
n
2 be a concrete realization
6
A B C
x y z
a b c
a ⊕ b ⊕ c = x ∧ y ∧ z
Min-Entropy Source
2 bits
Figure 1: One round of the protocol. Two bits from min-entropy source are used to produce
inputs into a GHZ test. The inputs and outputs have to fulfill a⊕ b⊕ c = x ∧ y ∧ z.
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of X. Let define Ei(r) as
Ei(r) = − log2
(
max
kl∈{0,1}2
P (Ri1R
i
2 = kl|R11R22, ..., Ri−11 Ri−12 = r11r22, ..., ri−11 ri−12 )
)
.
(6)
This value characterizes the amount of ”fresh” entropy in pair Ri1R
i
2, given
the outcomes of previous rounds. Note that it is possible to have Ei(r) = 0,
so such a source cannot be characterized by a non-trivial Santha-Vazirani
parameter.
Let us label inputs and outputs of i-th round as Xi, Yi, Zi (for example
we can set Xi = R
i
1, Yi = R
i
2, Zi = R
i
1 ⊕ Ri2 ⊕ 1) and Ai, Bi, Ci respectively.
Additionally let A = (A1, . . . , An) and B = (B1, . . . , Bn). If in any of the
rounds condition (5) is not fulfilled, the whole protocol aborts. Otherwise
the outcome of the protocol O is computed as
O = Ext(A,B), (7)
where Ext stands for a suitable randomness extractor; its specific choice will
be discussed later.
Let us evaluate the amount of randomness produced by a single round of
the protocol, based on entropy Ei(r) present in the two bits R
i
1R
i
2 used for
the choice of the inputs. There are two distinct types of rounds:
1. It holds thatEi(r) > log2(3); in this case P (R
i
1R
i
2 = xiyi|R11R12, ..., Rj1Rj2 =
r11r
1
2, ..., r
j
1r
j
2) > 0 for all four possible values of xi, yi ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}
and the only strategy fulfilling condition (5) with probability 1 is the
honest strategy of measuring GHZ states. As discussed before, in this
case bits Ai and Bi are uniformly distributed and independent of each
other as well as all the other previous inputs Xj, Yj, Zj, j ∈ {1, . . . , i}
and outputs Aj, Bj, Cj, j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1}. Probability of any other
strategy to fulfill (5) is bounded away from 1 as proven in [8].
2. It holds that Ei(r) ≤ log2(3); there exists a probability distribution P ,
such that P (Ri1R
i
2 = xiyi|R11R22, ..., Ri−11 Ri−12 = r11r22, ..., ri−11 ri−12 ) = 0
for at least one possible value of xi, yi ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}. In this case
there exists a classical strategy (which can be encoded in the common
information λ) that fulfills condition (5) with probability 1.
Based on this preliminary analysis, it is clear that for R ≤ log2(
√
3) there
exists a probability distribution on 2n bit strings, such that each of n rounds
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of the protocol is of type 2, and there is a classical deterministic strategy to
win all of them.
However, if R > log2(
√
3), with some non-zero probability there will be
some rounds of type 1 during the run of the protocol.
4.1. Zero error protocol
Let us first consider a scenario, in which the adversary doesn’t want to
risk getting caught at all. In this case rounds of type 1 need to be played
with honest GHZ strategy. This fact alone however doesn’t guarantee that
the output of the protocol contains some non-zero amount of randomness,
because the rounds of type 2 can in principle depend on the outcomes of the
earlier rounds of type 1.
As an example consider a very general scenario where the resulting bit O
is computed as a sum of partial results from individual rounds oi. Let oi be
a result of a round i of type 1, arbitrarily random. Let j by a subsequent
round of type 2. Devices and source can agree in advance that in round j
they will output results obtained in the round i independently on the inputs.
In such a case oj = oi and oj ⊕ oi = 0 and thus perfectly deterministic. The
win condition (5) will also be automatically satisfied. The price to pay is the
fact that the source had to select a specific outcome in the round j, which
decreases its entropy.
In what follows, we will analyze to what extent can the outcomes of the
rounds of type 2 negate any randomness produced in the rounds of type 1,
given a specific entropy of the source. Assume that k out of n rounds are
of type 1. Without the loss of generality we can assume that all k rounds
of type 1 are realized before n − k rounds of type 2. In fact, this order of
rounds gives the adversary the best possible situation to react in rounds of
type 2 on the randomness already produced in rounds of type 1.
In such ordering we have:
A =
(
~Ak, f
k+1
λ (
~Ak), . . . , f
n
λ ( ~Ak)
)
,
B =
(
~Bk, g
k+1
λ (
~Bk), . . . , g
n
λ( ~Bk)
)
, (8)
where ~Ak = (A1, . . . , Ak), ~Bk = (B1, . . . , Bk) are outcomes of the rounds of
type 1. Functions f jλ and g
j
λ, k+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n are particular strategies in round
j of type 2 attempting to increase the bias of the final bit, depending on the
outcomes of the rounds of type 1 and common information λ. Recall that λ
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is the common information between the devices, source and the adversary.
All these parties can be correlated only via this random variable. In a regime
where the adversary doesn’t want to risk getting caught at all, this means
that although vectors A and B are generally not independent, they can only
be dependent via λ. Therefore given λ, A and B are independent and their
respective conditional min-entropies are H∞(A|λ) = H∞(B|λ) = k. Thus we
can use any two source extractor Ext to extract the entropy present in A and
B. Since A and B are independent given λ, it holds that (Ext(A,B)|λ) will
be distributed according to the properties of the particular extractor (close
to being uniformly distributed given λ).
4.2. Hadamard extractor
In our analysis we choose a particular form of the extractor (7), which
defines our output bit as
O = Had(A,B) =
n⊕
i=1
(Ai ∧Bi). (9)
This extractor is called Hadamard extractor in the literature [25, 26, 27]
and it guarantees that (Ext(A,B)|λ) is 2(n−H∞(A|λ)−H∞(B|λ)−2)/2-close to a
uniformly distributed bit as long as H∞(A|λ) +H∞(B|λ) ≥ n2 . Therefore as
long as k > n
2
, regardless of the strategy employed in rounds of type 2, the
output bit is, at least to some extent, random. Note here that the requirement
on k could in principle be made lower by using different two-source extractors.
For example Bourgain’s extractor [28] produces non-deterministic bit as long
as the sum of the entropies of A and B is greater than 2n(1/2− α) for some
universal constant α and non-explicit extractors can go as low as k = O(log n)
[25].
In the light of the previous analysis we can obtain the upper bound for
the min-entropy rate, for which full cheating (maximum bias with probability
of getting caught equal to 0) is possible. In order to do so, let us represent
2n bit strings that the biased source X can output with non-zero probability
by a graph tree of depth n, where
• each of the vertices has at most 4 children and each edge from parent
to child is labeled by one of {00, 01, 10, 11},
• each vertex represents prefix of a concrete realization of r with r11, r12, . . . , ri1, ri2
encoded in the edge labels on the path from the root of the tree to the
given vertex,
10
00 01 10 11
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
round i
round i + 1
round i + 2
Figure 2: Optimal tree representation of the random variable that potentially enables full
cheating alternates between honest and dishonest vertices.
• each leaf represents a concrete realization of r.
Clearly, each vertex has at least
⌈
2Ei(r)
⌉
children. A vertex with 2Ei(r) > 3
will be called an honest vertex, as in this vertex an honest - quantum strategy
must be used, whereas all other vertices will be called dishonest vertices.
To give an upper bound on the min-entropy for which the adversary can
fully cheat, we need to find a tree with a maximal number of leafs, such that
for each path from the root to the leaf the number of honest vertices is smaller
or equal to the number of dishonest vertices. Apparently such tree can be
constructed by alternating between honest and deterministic vertices along
each path (see Figure (2)); such tree has
√
12
n
leafs. Uniform distribution
over
√
12
n
leaves maximizes the min-entropy that can be used to realize such
tree, yielding the min entropy rate of RH= log2 (12)/4. For any higher min-
entropy rate, there exists a leaf such that the number of honest vertices on
the path from the root to the leaf is higher than the number of dishonest
vertices, therefore the adversary cannot know the outcome of the protocol
with probability 1 without risking to be caught.
If the actual min-entropy rate of the source used is expressed as R = RH+
11
ε with arbitrary ε > 0, the probability of every single leaf in the tree will
be upper bounded by p1 = 2
−2nR =
√
12
−n
2−2εn. In such a tree no more
than
√
12
n
leaves will be of a form that allows cheating without risking to be
caught, so the overall probability of cheating success is bounded from above
by
pcheat ≤ 2−2εn, (10)
thus decreasing to zero exponentially with n. With this probability a bias of
the output bit 1
2
is achieved, whereas in all other leafs the bias is 0, so the
resulting bias of the output bit will be
bias(B) ≤ 2−(2εn+1). (11)
It is worth to mention that with growing R the number of cheatable leaves
is in fact decreasing and the actual cheating probability and consequently
also the resulting bias will thus be strictly lower. This is due to the fact that
with every extra leave added to the probability tree, some other leaves will
convert from a fully biased to a perfectly random outcome. This is due to
the fact that the extra leaves can be added only by adding a fourth child to
a dishonest vertex, which is in this way converted to an honest one, resulting
into honestness of its leafs (for depiction see Figure (3)).
The rate RH = log2(12)/4 is only an upper bound for the amount of min-
entropy for which the full cheating is possible. In fact, there is no constructive
attack that would be possible with such a min-entropy rate. As shown in the
appendix, the optimal implementable strategy is the one mentioned earlier
– in every other round the boxes simple resend the outcomes of the previous
honest round. Such strategy can tolerate less min-entropy than RH , as the
dishonest vertex connected to it’s honest parent by a 11 edge must have only
one child, also labeled 11 (see Figure 4).
Uniform distribution over the leaves of such tree has a min-entropy rate
Rmax = 1/4 log2 10, (12)
which is the highest rate for which full cheating is possible – half of the
rounds are of type 1, quantum and honest, and half of the rounds are of type
2, negating the bias of the output obtained of the previous runs. As soon as
R = Rmax + , the resulting bias exponentially converges to zero with the
same arguments as used for Hadamard extractor.
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00 01 10 11
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
round i
round i + 1
round i + 2
Figure 3: By adding a fourth child to a dishonest vertex, it is converted to an honest one in
the zero-error scenario. Thus all its children (in the dashed oval) have positive probability
to appear - therefore they all produce random outcomes in zero-error scenario. In the
risking scenario, the vertex stays dishonest, the added (dotted) child leads to abortion of
the protocol, however the other children remain deterministic.
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00 01 10 11
. . .
11
...
...
...
. . .
...
round i
round i + 1
round i + 2
Figure 4: The optimal achievable strategy is to repeat outcomes of the previous honest
round. Random inputs {001, 010, 100} are interchangeable, while input {111} needs to be
exactly repeated in the dishonest round.
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4.3. Risking to fail
In a realistic scenario, if it would not be possible for Eve to limit the
inputs as needed for full cheating (i. e. R > log2(12)/4), Eve could simply
try to use a classical strategy and guess the correct outcomes in some of
the honest rounds. Let us now analyze, what would be the probability of
successful cheating with such a strategy.
One can model such cheating strategy by adding extra leaves to the fully
cheatable tree (See Figure (3)). This can be achieved by adding a fourth
edge to some of the dishonest vertices. In such round, Eve would simply use
a classical strategy, which is successful only in three out of four realizations.
Therefore, if this new added edge is actually realized by the random source,
the protocol fails by not satisfying (5). The number of leaves for which this
strategy is successful stays exactly
√
12
n
and all the other leaves lead to
failure of the protocol. With a min-entropy rate R = RH + ε the minimal
number of leaves in the tree is
√
12
n
22εn, thus the probability of not failing
the protocol is pguess = 2
−2εn. Comparing to pcheat (10) we see that the
probability of successfully cheating the protocol by risking is the same as the
upper bound of the probability of successful cheating of the protocol without
risking.
One might think about a more general attack where some reasonable bias
is achieved with a very small probability of the protocol to fail by using a
quantum strategy utilizing other than GHZ states. We limited ourselves to
the analysis of quantum strategies that do not use entangled states across
the individual rounds of the protocol. Using the SDP introduced in [16] we
numerically showed that the bias of the output bit b achievable by any quan-
tum strategy, if the failure probability in every round is upper bounded by
pf , is upper bounded by bias(b)
2 ≤ pf . Such strategy can be in fact realized
by using states close to GHZ and by suitable changing the measurements
used by the devices to POVM measurements with some pre-shared classical
information. By utilizing this approach the adversary can slightly adjust
results of the non-corrected quantum rounds with only a small probability
of aborting the protocol. But due to the polynomial dependence between
the bias and the failure probability, either the bias of the output bit or the
probability of successful finishing of the protocol stays exponentially small.
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5. Conclusion
We have presented a scheme for production of almost perfect random
numbers with intrusted quantum devices and a single weak random source,
based on tri-partite GHZ-type entanglement. This scheme can be used for
production of perfect randomness by parallel monitoring of the honesty of the
devices. We use min-entropy to characterize the randomness of the source,
which guarantees the minimal possible assumptions about its detail charac-
teristics, in particular about any local behavior. This allows amplification of
a wide variety of weak random sources including sources not amplifiable by
already known procedures.
In contrast to previous results, here we repeatedly reuse the same devices
during the amplification protocol, using just three independent devices with
arbitrary amount of memory available. A drawback of the protocol, left for
the future research, is that it is not fault-tolerant – it will abort with the
first wrong output and thus is not experimentally feasible yet.
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Appendix A. Optimality of the ”Re-send” strategy
Let us here analyze, if and to what extent can the adversary, using pro-
tocol rounds of type 2, bias the output bit B. To effectively do this, the
strategy for output in these rounds must depend on outputs of some of the
previous rounds - any fixed strategy would produce only fixed bits that would
not influence the bias of the final bit B. We show, that the optimal strategy
in round of type 2 is simply to resend outputs created by honest strategy in
a single previous round of type 1.
In the round j, which is considered to be of the type 2, the outputs of
the devices A, B, and C will be respectively
f jλ(a1, . . . , aj−1, x1, . . . , xj) (A.1)
gjλ(b1, . . . , bj−1, y1, . . . , yj)
hjλ(c1, . . . , cj−1, z1, . . . , zj),
where we assume that all rounds 1, . . . , j − 1 are honest. This assumption
doesn’t change the generality of the result, because previous rounds of type
2 are deterministic and do not add any randomness into the final output B.
Outcomes of these functions also need to fulfill the condition (5), that
can be considered in the form
f jλ ⊕ gjλ ⊕ hjλ = xj ∧ yj ∧ zj(λ, x1, y1, z1, ..., xj−1, yj−1, zj−1), (A.2)
where x and y are parameterized the same way as z. At the first glance it
might look like there is no way that functions f , g or h might depend on
previous outputs, as the right hand side of (A.2) cannot depend on it. This
is however not entirely true. The fact that the protocol continues means that
conditions (5) for all previous rounds were fulfilled and the condition (A.2)
can be thus rewritten (omitting explicit dependence on the parameters x, y
and z) as
f jλ ⊕ gjλ ⊕ hjλ = xj ∧ yj ∧ zj(λ, a1 ⊕ b1 ⊕ c1, ..., aj−1 ⊕ bj−1 ⊕ cj−1). (A.3)
Let us now examine the condition (A.3) in more detail. The goal is
to show that functions f jλ, g
j
λ, and h
j
λ have to have a specific form, de-
pending only on common information λ. To demonstrate this, consider
an arbitrary (honest) round i < j. Let us define vectors of parameters
~xj = (x1, . . . , xj−1), ~ai = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , aj−1) and partial function
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f jλ,~ai,~xj(ai) = f
j
λ(a1, . . . , aj−1, x1, . . . , xj). Also consider g
j
λ,~bi,~yj
(bi) and h
j
λ,~ci,~zj
(ci)
defined analogously. All f jλ,~ai,~xj(ai), g
j
λ,~bi,~yj
(bi) and h
j
λ,~ci,~zj
(ci) are functions
mapping one bit into one bit. There are only four functions of this type, two
are constant – mapping both inputs into a constant output 0 or 1, and two
of them are balanced – identity and negation.
Now we can rewrite (A.3) as
f jλ,~ai,~xj(ai)⊕ g
j
λ,~bi,~yj
(bi)⊕ hjλ,~ci,~zj(ci) =
= xj ∧ yj ∧ zj(λ, a1 ⊕ b1 ⊕ c1, ..., aj−1 ⊕ bj−1 ⊕ cj−1). (A.4)
In the next step let us grant the source additional knowledge. Namely,
let us suppose that the inputs xj, yj, zj for j
th round are chosen with the full
knowledge of outputs of rounds 1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , j − 1, along with all
the previous inputs. This is equivalent to the full knowledge of functions
f jλ,~ai,~xj(), g
j
λ,~bi,~yj
(), hjλ,~ci,~zj().
Therefore the only knowledge the source doesn’t posses about the out-
comes of the jth round are values of ai, bi and ci. However, it knows their
XOR ai⊕bi⊕ci. This knowledge allows it to discriminate between quadruples
of possible outputs. They were either from {000, 110, 101, 011}, if ai⊕bi⊕ci =
0, or from {111, 001, 010, 100}, if ai ⊕ bi ⊕ ci = 1. In order to fulfill (A.4),
f jλ,~ai,~xj(ai), g
j
λ,~bi,~yj
(bi), h
j
λ,~ci,~zj
(ci) must append the same output for all ai, bi
and ci with the same XOR.
Now we show that to fulfill (A.4), all f jλ,~ai,~xj(ai), g
j
λ,~bi,~yj
(bi) and h
j
λ,~ci,~zj
(ci)
must be either simultaneously constant or simultaneously balanced. We pro-
ceed with a proof by contradiction and without loss of generality assume
f jλ,~ai,~xj(ai) is constant and g
j
λ,~bi,~yj
(bi) is balanced. Then there is no function
hjλ,~ci,~zj(ci) which can fulfill the condition (A.4) (see table (A.1)).
It remains to show that the constant/balanced property can depend only
on previously shared information λ. To show this is indeed true, let us fix the
value of vectors ~ai and ~xi and without loss of generality suppose f
j
λ,~ai,~xj
(ai)
is balanced. Because all rounds i < j are honest, each value of vectors ~bi and
~yi can appear in a run with ~ai and ~xi with non-zero probability. Therefore,
in order to fulfill (A.4) with probability 1, gj
λ,~bi,~yj
(bi) must be balanced for
each value of ~bi and ~yi. By symmetry, the same argument can be used to
show that the constant/balanced property can depend only on λ.
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ai ⊕ bi ⊕ ci aibici f jλ,~ai,~xj(ai) = 0 g
j
λ,~bi,~yj
(bi) = id h
j
λ,~ci,~zj
(ci)
1 001 0 0 1/0
1 010 0 1 0/1
1 100 0 0 1/0
1 111 0 1 0/1
0 011 0 1 1/0
0 101 0 0 0/1
0 110 0 1 1/0
0 000 0 0 0/1
Table A.1: Without loss of generality we chose f jλ,~ai,~xj (ai) = 0 and g
j
λ,~bi,~yj
(bi) identity.
Choosing any other combination of constant/balanced function will result only in negation
of the appropriate column. Since the source has only a limited information about outcomes
ai, bi, ci, namely their XOR, it can discriminate between quadruples of inputs in second
column. For this reason f jλ,~ai,~xj (ai)⊕ g
j
λ,~bi,~yj
(bi)⊕ hjλ,~ci,~zj (ci) must be constant for these
quadruples and we filled in column of hjλ,~ci,~zj (ci) accordingly. However, such column
doesn’t define a function, which is a contradiction.
Without the loss of generality we can suppose that part of the common
information λ contains information about the partial function for each i and
j in the form of (αji , λi). The partial functions are fully specified by these
parameters as
f jλ,~ai,~xj(ai) = f
j
λ(ai) = (α
j
i ∧ ai)⊕ f jλi(~ai, ~xj) (A.5)
gj
λ,~bi,~yj
(bi) = g
j
λ(ai) = (α
j
i ∧ bi)⊕ gjλi(~bi, ~yj)
hjλ,~ci,~zj(ci) = h
j
λ(ai) = (α
j
i ∧ ci)⊕ hjλi(~ci, ~zj).
The parameter αji specifies if the partial function in j
th round for ith
parameter is constant (αji = 0) or balanced (α
j
i = 1), and parameter λi
specifies concrete functions of previous inputs and outputs. These functions
can only influence which concrete balanced or concrete constant function
is used in the given round (if the function is equal to 1 XOR effectively
negates the output). Recall that this needs to hold for all i < j. If we define
Sj = {i|i < j, αji = 1}, we have the following form of the functions
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f jλ(a1, . . . , aj−1, x1, . . . , xj) =
⊕
i∈Sj
ai ⊕ f ′j
gjλ(b1, . . . , bj−1, y1, . . . , yj) =
⊕
i∈Sj
bi ⊕ g′j
hjλ(c1, . . . , cj−1, z1, . . . , zj) =
⊕
i∈Sj
ci ⊕ h′j, (A.6)
where f ′j, g
′
j, h
′
j depend only on common information λ, inputs into concrete
devices and outputs of rounds ` /∈ Sj, thus effectively only choosing between
negation of the output or identity.
Let us now analyze to what extent these outputs in a specific round can
help to bias the final output bit. With k rounds of the type 1 and a single
round of type 2 the output bit will have the form (up to a constant factor
not changing the bias)
B =
k⊕
i=1
(ai ∧ bi)⊕
(⊕
i∈S
ai ∧
⊕
i∈S
bi
)
. (A.7)
If S is empty, trivially the output bias is 2−(k+1). If S has one element, say
t, with the k+ 1st round the result of t-th round is repeated (thus effectively
negating it) and the bias of the output result decreases to 2−k. To evaluate
the output for s = |S| > 1, let us rewrite the expression (A.7) into the form
B =
⊕
i/∈S
(ai ∧ bi)⊕
[⊕
i∈S
(ai ∧ bi)⊕
(⊕
i∈S
ai ∧
⊕
i∈S
bi
)]
. (A.8)
The first part of the expression depends only on the rounds not incorporated
in the set S and is easy to compute; it yields a bias 2−(k+1−s).
Let us now calculate the bias of the second part. Denote as ka and kb the
number of 1’s in all outputs ai and bj with i, j ≤ s respectively. It is easy to
see that the correcting round will change the output bit if and only if both
ka and kb are odd. We can now calculate the bias as the difference between
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the fraction of outputs 0 and 1/2:
bias (B) =
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 122s
s∑
ka,kb=0
(
s
ka
) max∑
i=min
(
ka
i
)(
s− ka
kb − i
)
1 + (−1)i+kakb
2
− 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣
min = Max (0, ka + kb − s) (A.9)
max = Min (ka, kb) .
This sum can be evaluated and yields 2−(s+1) for s even and 2−s for s odd.
Thus, altogether the bias of the output bit is either 2−(k+1) if s is even or 2−k
for s odd. So we can conclude that the best result the adversary can hope
for with one round of type 2 is to negate the result of one of the previous
rounds of the type 1.
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